

**Nana Bakhsoliani**

*Doctor of History, Associate Professor, Georgian Technical University*

**Salome Kavtaradze**

*Doctoral student, Georgian Technical University*

## **TWO GERMANYS – THE POLICY MADE IN TWO CAMPS (GFR, GDR)**

### **Abstract**

After the end of World War II, Germany passed main stages of development through transition from the balance of international policy power to a bipolar system, with shaping of the world into three worlds and changes to establish a stable hegemony. The first stage that Germany went through was associated with its split into two parts. Germany was divided into four occupation zones: Eastern occupation zone belonged to the USSR, three occupation zones of the USA, France and Great Britain were created on the territory of West Germany. In fact, it was a big ideological split between Western and Eastern blocs.

**Key words:** two Germanys, balance of powers, hegemonic stability, two camps.

### **Theoretical-conceptual approaches of German foreign policy**

As conceptual constructions of political analysis we used the theories of balance of power, three worlds, hegemonic stability and two camps.

According to the balance of power theory, states are the actors, who at least try to save themselves, at most strive for world domination. States use: 1. Internal efforts (to develop economic potential, increase military power and elaborate sound strategy) and external efforts (to strengthen their own alliance or weaken the opposing alliance).<sup>11</sup>

Hegemon establishes an order, which leads to stability among states and is subject to certain conditions. The hegemon will advance thanks to the increased economic development that comes from industrialization.<sup>22</sup>

Quite correct is Charles Kindleberger's opinion that the presence of the hegemon leads to disastrous consequences – formation of closed economic systems, economic instability and division of the world into hostile blocs.<sup>33</sup>

It is in the interests of a hegemonic state to maintain global system; therefore, it protects the interests of the entire system along with national interests. Hegemony distributes labor between developed, industrial states, and between the center and periphery, hegemon must protect capitalist system<sup>44</sup>.

To the change in American foreign policy Stalin responded by creating the Cominform on 30 September 1947. It was a communist information service, which included the communist parties of Europe. This organization called itself the organization of free socialist camp, but in fact it controlled Stalin's foreign policy.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Waltz. *Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power*, Chrestomathy, 2004, pp.71-72

<sup>2</sup> Organski A. F. K., Kugler J. (1980). *The War Ledger*. Seattle, p. 61-63.

<sup>3</sup> Kindleberger Ch., (1974). *The World Depression: 1929-1939~*, Seattle University of California press. London (1986). P.39-42. <http://books.google>. P.289-294.

<sup>4</sup> Wallerstein I., (2005). *World Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Seattle, p. 58-60.

<sup>5</sup> Eklkofer Volker (11.05.2015 ) *Verteidigungsbündnis des Ostens* <https://www.br.de/-radio/bayern2/sendungen/radiowissen/geschichte/warschauer-pakt-buendnis-100.html> [12.06.2024].

Speaking at the founding conference of Cominform, Zhdanov characterized America and the West as warmakers. In his opinion, the plan developed by the USA served to exert imperialist influence on Europe. For this reason, Zhdanov saw the world as divided into two camps: the imperialist and undemocratic America and the anti-imperialist and democratic Soviet Union. With his speech he laid foundation to the theory of two camps /*Zwei-Lager Theory*. According to the theory, the task of communist parties was to protect themselves from imperialist America. He believed that American liberal ideas and ideology was just a mask with capitalist imperialism hidden behind it. Zhdanov was certain that the Soviet Union was the only, who, could stop war and fought for the world peace. In his opinion, the Marshall Plan was the beginning of imperialism in Europe.

Our goal is a theoretical and conceptual analysis of the policies pursued in two camps – FRG and the GDR

### Germany divided into two parts

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, Stalin's goal was to secure communism ideology and bring Eastern Europe under Soviet influence. Therefore, his plan was not to maintain the pre-war balance of power in Europe, but to subjugate Europe and replace German occupation with communist regime. Thus, after the end of the war, the goal of the United States became to use military and economic power and stop further spread of communist dictatorship, also to contribute to the decline and collapse of the communist regime and its stronghold, the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

The reason for the division of Germany into two parts was the decision of Western countries – to make the zones under their jurisdiction a single economic space. This would reduce the influence of the USSR.

For this reason, monetary reform took place, the Reichsmark was replaced by the Deutsche Mark, American financial assistance was carried out according to the plan developed by US Secretary of State – Marshall. West Germany received 1.3 billion dollars in 1948-51. It also helped the Eastern zone, but the USSR rejected the offer and accused the United States of the attempt to enslave Europe. All this determined peculiar development of Western and Eastern zones. Namely, on 23 May 1949, FRG was officially created, and GDR was officially created in the Eastern zone on 7 October of the same year.

In the fall of 1949, formation of the USSR as a nuclear state showed that the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western countries was clear. In June 1950 with the support of the Soviet Union, North Korea attacked South Korea and thus showing that similar scenario could happen in divided Germany.

This is why FRG set the goals: securing democracy and freedom, economic recovery, protection of Berlin from three Western threats, expanding the space for action to restore sovereignty and restoring the unity of the state. Western powers could ensure preservation of the sovereignty.<sup>27</sup>

**Adenauer's goal** was to reconcile Western democracies and get closer to France. In his opinion, the allied forces opposing the USSR were interested in activating FRG. The threat from the USSR posed the task for rapid integration of Germany: the USA supported armament of Germany. France refrained in this regard. Adenauer linked the issue to strengthening peace and security in Europe with the guarantees for the security of West Germany and Western sector of Berlin, the occupation statute was to be amended by the treaty with the alliance members. This was the guarantee for Germany's protection from external threats.<sup>38</sup>

### From the balance of powers to two camps

<sup>1</sup>Kronenberg V., (07.12.2009). Grundzüge deutscher Außenpolitik 1949-1990 | Deutsche Außenpolitik [https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/deutsche-aussenpolitik-304/7892/grundzuege-deutscher-aussenpolitik-1949-1990/\[12.05.2024\]](https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/deutsche-aussenpolitik-304/7892/grundzuege-deutscher-aussenpolitik-1949-1990/[12.05.2024]).

<sup>2</sup>Sven Bernhard Garries, Foreign and Security Policy of Germany, Tbilisi, 2021, pp. 66-69.

<sup>3</sup>Haftendorm Helga, 2001: Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbenutzung, Stuttgart/München, 33f

The balance of powers failed to be the way for avoiding crises and wars. Its goal was not so much peace as stability and moderation. According to H. Kissinger, empires were not interested in operating within the international system; they themselves try to be the system.<sup>19</sup>

During the Cold War, the United States was involved in an ideological, political and strategic struggle with the USSR, in which the two leading states of the world enjoyed the principles different from the balance of power. The confrontation led to the victory of one force and defeat of the other. The US had political, economic and military means to defend free world from communism. Even though the USSR was a superpower, it was an economic dwarf.

An important stage in this context was the onset of the Berlin crisis, which later turned into the Cold War.

After the WWII the USA was preparing for a long peace. The telegram from George Kennan (the second American diplomat to the USSR) signaled that the USSR was beginning to spread its influence throughout the world and threaten Western democracies. Kennan wrote that the Kremlin had neurotic view of world politics that stemmed from their traditional instincts and sense of insecurity. The USSR leaders knew that their artificial regime could not stand comparison with Western political systems. Kennan characterized the leaders of the USSR as envious, fearful, and paralyzed by the lack of quality information about the outside world.<sup>210</sup> According to Kennan, the USSR would begin a campaign to weaken national

self-confidence of the United States and Western European society. The goal was to provoke social unrest and industrial disruption in Western democracies.<sup>311</sup>

Kennan's long telegram was followed by what Churchill termed the "Iron Curtain", which descended across the continent from Stettin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic. This was proof of the world division into two camps.

The US President Harry Truman announced the doctrine at the Congress in Washington held in response to the actions of the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine became central ideology and political guide of the Cold War and led to the world division into two ideologically opposed camps. The doctrine supported free nations who resisted the expansion of the Soviet Union.

Thus, Truman's policy was the policy of America's containment, which had been the course of American foreign policy since 1947. The goal was to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence and expand the influence of the USA.<sup>412</sup>

Having taken a strong position in the Cold War, the United States wanted to strengthen European economy. Western European countries should not be economically dependent on Eastern European countries. The echo of this was the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, which implied economic and social revival of the continent destroyed after the war.

Strong Europe could be a partner for the US in trade issues. It was a long-term economic development plan; this is how the Transatlantic Partnership was shaped along with geo-political integration of Europe.

An alternative to the Marshall Plan was the Mutual Assistance Council created by the USSR: *RGW der Rat für gegünstigie Wirtschaftshilfe*.

Stalin responded to the change in American foreign policy by creating the Cominform. It was a communist information service, which included the communist parties of Europe. This organization called itself the organization of free socialist camp, but in fact it directed Stalin's foreign policy.<sup>513</sup>

Some Eastern European countries were willing to participate in the Marshall Plan but were forced to obey Soviet orders. For example, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, however Yugoslavia managed to

<sup>1</sup> Kissinger H., Diplomacy, Tbilisi, 2021. p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> George F Kennan, The Long Telegram, february 22, 1946, 13 [www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study)

<sup>3</sup> Larry Diamond. Evil thoughts, Economic Policy Research Center, 2019, p. 119-120

<sup>4</sup> Fesser G., Gutjahr, Hans-Joachim., (20.04.2020).Basiswissen Schule. Geschichte: 7. Klasse S.410

<sup>5</sup> Rudiger W.,Müller H., Biedert Hans-Kart. (12.04.2018). STARK Abitur-Training – Geschichte Band 2.Deutschland seit 1945. Europäische Einigung. Welpolitic der Gegenwart. S.73.

support the Marshall Plan, which was replaced by the Mutual Defense Act.

Adenauer believed that if Germany pursued an isolationist policy, it would become a pawn of the Soviet Union, as the SED regime under Walter Ulbricht sought to integrate East Germany into the Soviet Union.<sup>114</sup>

The foreign policy of East Germany, unlike the foreign policy of West Germany, was limited, because within the framework of socialist internationalism, it did not have wide maneuvering opportunities for its own foreign policy initiatives. This was not in the interests of the Soviet brotherly power.

And for Adenauer, main goal was to create a democratic state, which would be far from the ideology of communism, and that an economically stronger, multi-party West would accelerate the process of German reunification. He believed in Kurt Schumacher's theory of magnetism, that economically strengthened West Germany would attract East Germany like a magnet. This was clearly demonstrated by the migration of the population from Berlin.<sup>215</sup> Although Konrad Adenauer did not live to see the implementation of this idea, nevertheless, he succeeded to use the world situation in favor of Germany, which meant creation of common army with the participation of Germany and restoration of sovereignty in return.

Restoration of the sovereignty of West Germany was largely determined by the circumstances in the world.

Division of Europe into two antagonist camps, resulted in a bipolar world order, which entailed several problems. For example, the Korean War, the tandem of China and the USSR.

Therefore, America needed a strong ally like Europe. Thus, America perceived West Germany as a partner country in the fight against the Soviet Union and supported the armament of Germany, which was opposed by France, as strengthened Germany would again pose a threat to the security of France. America also had plan „B“ – FRG would become a NATO member, and would be prohibited to use biological, chemical and atomic weapons, the so-called ABC weapons; however, it would have army. In return, it would receive sovereignty. 10 years after the end of the war, Federal Republic of Germany regained its sovereignty and joined the Western Defense Alliance, NATO, in 1955; in response, the communist states of Eastern Europe united and formed the Warsaw Pact in the same year 1955. It was a NATO counter-alliance, the leading power of which was the Soviet Union until its collapse.<sup>316</sup>

Main goal of the foreign policy of GDR was its international recognition as a sovereign state.

West Germany succeeded to sort out its foreign policy and restore its reputation on the West Flank within just 10 years from the end of the war, but it fell farther and farther away from the path to national unity. Adenauer found it unacceptable to achieve this through alternative ties with the West, such as united but neutral Germany, as was presented in the Stalin Note.<sup>417</sup>

The West believed that Stalin would extend his control over entire Germany. In their opinion, this letter was propagandist and served to improve Stalin's reputation. The Note spoke of a democratic future for united Germany but made no mention of free elections. Adenauer was certain, that good future for Germany could only be achieved through cooperation with Western powers, and Stalin's actions were a bluff and an obstacle to Germany's integration with the West. This decision was met with mixed reviews in the GDR. Representatives of Social Democratic Party thought that Adenauer's decision was hasty. Kurt Schumacher said they missed the chance to unite Germany. Jacob Kaiser, chairman of Christian Democratic Party, thought that united Germany would act as a bridge between East and West and end the Cold War.

Rejection of the Stalin Note drove West and East Germany further apart, which was compounded by

<sup>1</sup> Kronenberg V., (07.12.2009). Grundzüge deutscher Außenpolitik 1949-1990 | Deutsche Außenpolitik [https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/deutsche-aussenpolitik-304/7892/grundzuege-deutscher-aussenpolitik-1949-1990/\[12.05.2024\]](https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/deutsche-aussenpolitik-304/7892/grundzuege-deutscher-aussenpolitik-1949-1990/[12.05.2024]).

<sup>2</sup> F. Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989. Harper Collins, 2006. p.486.

<sup>3</sup> Sven Bernhard Garries, Sven B. Garries Deutschland's Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Eine Einführung p.61 62; Schwarz, Hans-Peter 1981: Die Ära Adenauer 1949-57, Stuttgart Deutsche Vertagsanstadt. P.97.

<sup>4</sup> Würrz, Markus (29.02.2016). Stalin-Noten <http://www.hdg.de/leomo/kapitel/geteiltes-deutschland-gruenderjahre/deutsche-frage/stalin-noten.html> [28.06.2024].

Germany's accession to NATO in 1955. In response, GDR became a member of the Warsaw Pact. It was also a member of the Mutual Aid Council created in response to the Warsaw Plan. This meant that GDR was firmly integrated into the Eastern Bloc, thus preventing reunification of Germany.

The Berlin Wall made it clear that the settlement of disunity with the Soviet Union was an illusion; escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis further strained relations between Washington and Moscow, all politicians in Bonn clearly saw that the Magnet theory had failed so far and reconciliation with East should be left to the next generation.

## Conclusion

Foreign policies of Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic differed significantly in their contrasting ideological orientations and strategic goals. The focus of FRG on the integration with Western Europe and its commitment to democratic values led to the foreign policy giving priority to the alliances with NATO and the European Economic Union. In contrast, commitment of GDR to the Soviet Union and socialist principles led to the foreign policy centred on the alliances in the Eastern Bloc.

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